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The use of climate engineering or geoengineering technologies to combat climate
change has been a controversial topic, even in the scientific debate. In recent studies, it
has been claimed that the debate on climate engineering technologies may be closing
down prematurely, with detrimental effects on the possibility of social and ethical
reflection in appraising these controversial technologies. We examined the extent to
which the debate on climate engineering is opening up or closing down, analyzing the
diversity of English-speaking newspaper frames in the period 2006–2011. The results
provide strong support for an opening of the debate, especially since 2009, given the
decline of overly deterministic frames, the emergence of frames related to
sociopolitical issues and an overall more balanced distribution of the various frames.
This provides evidence that different perspectives are voiced in the public debate,
which may enable societies to critically reflect on these emerging technologies.
Keywords: climate engineering; geoengineering; newspaper frames; environmental
technology
1. Introduction
Geoengineering, or climate engineering, refers to techniques that either remove carbon
dioxide from the atmosphere, also known as carbon dioxide removal, or deflect incoming
solar radiation, commonly referred to as solar radiation management (SRM). Many
uncertainties exist with respect to potential risks, costs, feasibility and effectiveness of the
technologies, many of which can have regional or global side effects. Field tests are
necessary to reduce these uncertainties, but these may already be full of risk, as some
technologies cannot be properly tested without full-scale implementation (Robock et al.
2010). This has led to public debate and criticism: for example, the SPICE (stratospheric
particle injection for climate engineering) experiment in Norfolk (UK) was postponed due
to protest from environmental groups; in the end, the project was cancelled because of lack
of rules, and an intellectual property rights dispute (Cressey 2012).
Until recently most of the discussion on climate engineering has taken place between
scientists and knowledgeable policy-makers, addressing mainly technological and
environmental aspects. During 2006 and 2007, climate engineering became a more
prominent topic in media coverage (Nerlich and Jaspal 2012) and it is now emerging in the
public sphere. The debate about climate engineering seems to be expanding, not only by
attracting more social actors, policy-makers, citizens and non-governmental organisations
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(NGOs), but also by raising questions about ethical and social implications, following a
broader trend towards requests for public deliberation on controversial environmental
topics (Kru¨tli et al. 2010).
Media exert considerable power on the public and political agenda, as they constitute
the principal arena where policy relevant issues come to the attention of these groups
(Nisbet and Lewenstein 2002). In previous studies, it has been emphasized how the
increase in attention to climate change coverage is linked to science–politics interaction
(Boykoff and Boykoff 2007). Moreover, the media may shape public understanding of
topics, especially with respect to scientific issues as “knowledge about science comes
largely through mass media, not through scientific publications or direct involvement in
science” (Corbett and Durfee 2004). Public attitude towards climate engineering is
important in relation to its further development, as the very concept provokes strong and
often divided positions (Corner et al. 2012).
Similarly, the media may influence the political agenda, because political actors are to
some extent comparably influenced by the media as the public (Lyytima¨ki 2007). More
importantly, politicians often take the media as a mirror of public opinion, whether this is
truly the case or not (Linsky 1986).
Only two attempts so far have been made to study media attention on climate
engineering (Nerlich and Jaspal 2012; Buck, forthcoming). While the former focused on
the metaphors in the news stories on geoengineering, the latter investigated the frames and
the voices around geoengineering, using both print and broadcast media. Both publications
are very important, insofar as they are the first to investigate media discourses and media
actors on geoengineering. What is missing, however, for our understanding of the topic is
how these media discourses and frames have evolved. On a topic so new and changing as
climate engineering, the way media present it is expected to change over time.
More precisely, because of the trend to frame climate change as a catastrophe and
climate engineering as the only way to avert it, it is suggested that the debate about climate
engineering might be closing down instead of opening up (Nerlich and Jaspal 2012). This
would influence the public discussion on geoengineering technologies, especially since
scholars have argued that upstream engagement with geoengineering should be based on a
plurality of different voices (Corner et al. 2012). We wish to contest this notion of “closing
down” of the debate, using empirical material on how media frames on climate
engineering have emerged, how they have evolved over time, and whether we can see
increasing diversity of media frames. English-language newspaper articles between 2002
and 2011 are analyzed for the presence of frames, using both qualitative and quantitative
analyses.
The paper is thus addressing the following questions: What are the common newspaper
frames related to climate engineering? How have these newspaper frames evolved over
time?
2. Theoretical background
2.1 Communicating environmental science and technology
The traditional science communication model, whereby science produces “true
knowledge” and the media translate this information into understandable language, has
been challenged, as we have come to understand that science and journalism construct
truth or knowledge according to the different principles (Weingart 1998; Peters et al.
2008). Journalists may use frames to package information so that they can quickly identify
and classify it, especially when reporting on issues they are not familiar with (Nisbet and
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Lewenstein 2002). Once a topic has already been framed by the media, it can become
difficult for external influences to bring about a shift in perspectives (ibid.). As a previous
study suggested, scientists strategies for attracting media attention can be successful, in
terms of media coverage, but the content of media will also be shaped by media logic, as
well as the national context (Ho¨ijer et al. 2006).
Climate engineering is a complex scientific issue, involving technologies that do not
make part of our daily lives. As such, it can be conceptualized as an emerging technology;
such technologies have been studied extensively in technology studies (Nisbet and
Lewenstein 2002). People get in touch with emerging technologies through mass media,
which is why media coverage provides a key heuristic to the public (Ho¨ijer et al. 2006), as
well as to policy-makers.
Much contemporary framing research of emerging technologies is inspired by an older
study on the media discourse and public opinion on nuclear power between 1945 and
1989, which identified three frames to be most prevalent: (1) progress, which describes
nuclear power in terms of “society’s commitment to technological development and
economic growth” (p. 4), (2) public accountability, which puts emphasis on the misleading
of the public by the nuclear industry and (3) runaway, which portrays a fatalistic position
on nuclear power, i.e. something that will spin out of control after it is unleashed (Gamson
and Modigliani 1989).
The progress frame was dominant in the early stages of media communication of
nuclear technology, confirmed by scholars studying other types of emerging technologies
(Nisbet and Lewenstein 2002; Scheufele and Lewenstein 2005). This is understandable as
new discoveries are brought to light by their proponents, who emphasize the benefits of the
technology and believe that the use of technology will lead to societal progress.
Following these early stages, the media discourse can become more controversial,
stressing doubts about the safety of the emerging technology (Gamson and Modigliani
1989). Media coverage refers at this later stage to the technology in terms of industry
secrecy, exclusion of the public, caught in the public accountability frame, or in terms of
the runaway nature of the technology (Nisbet 2009). Looking into the frames of
nanotechnologies, Scheufele and Lewenstein (2005) suggested that as soon as media
coverage of the issue expands, “we will see more and more a war of words” and coverage
becomes more focused on controversy (p. 665). This is not to say that media coverage
consequently became more negative; a struggle of interests trying to frame the debate may
lead to the inclusion of both risks and benefits of the technology, which Gamson and
Modigliani (1989) described as the devil’s bargain frame. We would consider this as an
opening up of the debate, as new frames appear, and the controversy, which is inevitably
surrounding new technologies, is brought to the fore.
Building further on this work, Nisbet (2009) developed a general set of frames
concerning scientific issues: social progress, economic development, morality/ethics,
scientific/technical uncertainty, Pandora’s box/runaway science, public accountability/
governance, middle way/alternative path and conflict/strategy. These serve as an
important framework for the analysis conducted in this paper.
2.2 Framing climate engineering
As a new scientific topic, we expect that frames in scientific literature may influence
frames in newspapers, since in new issues external influences coming from political actors,
scientists or other elite groups are of large importance as a source of frames (Scheufele
1999).
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It is suggested that “the heart of the resistance to geoengineering . . . is fear of the
unknown” (Davies 2011). Anticipated side effects of climate engineering could be
quantified now, but the “unknown unknowns” may only become apparent once climate
engineering has already been implemented (Boyd 2008). These unanticipated side effects
are worrisome, especially since they could be irreversible (Robock et al. 2010).
However, the risks of climate change may be larger than those of climate engineering.
Those who favour climate engineering, often talk of it as “the lesser of two evils” or an
emergency measure in a bad situation (Preston 2011). Climate engineering could serve as
a “plan B”, when emission reductions “achieve too little too late” (Shepherd et al. 2009).
Further research into climate engineering is thus advocated so that if we ever need to
deploy it, we can do so wisely. For others, this argument unravels another concern; as
research on climate engineering continues, implementation will become more likely
(Bunzl 2009). We may never have a sound basis for deploying climate engineering, since
there is no “practice planet” on which these technologies can be tested (ibid.).
In addition, the fear exists that climate engineering will divert attention from current
mitigation and adaptation efforts, also known as the moral hazard dilemma (Virgoe 2009;
Davies 2011), particularly the SRM methods, which do not address the root of climate
change (greenhouse gases). Moreover, it is suggested that global warming is not a
technical problem but a political problem, in which case climate engineering is not a
proper solution (Robock 2008). Some scholars question the capacity of technology as a
solution to global warming: “We would be taking on the ultimate state of hubris to believe
we can control Earth” (Kiehl 2006). This argument is part of a much larger debate about
the relationship between man and nature, which questions human ability to manipulate,
control, modify or manage natural systems (Preston 2011).
With respect to policy, fears have been expressed that when climate engineering
remains unregulated, “rogue states” could act unilaterally, posing risks for others (Barrett
2008). Joint action is not a requirement for the deployment of climate engineering.
Moreover, side effects may be unevenly distributed, creating “winners” and “losers”. This
may generate questions about liability (Virgoe 2009) and increase the potential for conflict
between nations (Boyd 2009). Existing international law does not address climate
engineering directly, which is why scientists urge governments to start thinking about
regulation (ibid.).
Given the aforementioned arguments we may expect the following frames to be
present in newspapers: risks and uncertainty, climate engineering as plan B, relationship
between man and nature, climate engineering versus mitigation and governance of
climate engineering. The two previous studies on geoengineering also find similar
frames.
Buck (forthcoming), who performed a study on the media attention on climate
engineering, analyzed 93 articles from “major world newspapers” between 1990 and mid-
2010 and found five key narrative frames: (1) the catastrophic, the most common,
described climate change as a catastrophe, which is linked to the need to “save” the planet;
(2) the cautionary, doubting climate engineering; (3) the spatiotemporal struggle; (4) the
managerial, which frames geoengineering as cheap solution and reward and (5) the
bildungsroman, linked to the metaphor of a patient – the planet – which we need to cure.
Even though this distinction is certainly useful, the work does not make any differentiation
between earlier and later frames, while literature suggests that such a difference can be
expected. Furthermore, no links were made with previous media studies on emerging
technologies, which is needed in order to make comparisons of trends of media frames
over time.
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Nerlich and Jaspal (2012) performed a metaphor analysis on 91 newspaper articles
between 1988 and 2010. They demonstrated that “metaphors, analogies and arguments
were mainly used to frame geoengineering as a last resort technology that has to be
adopted in a context of impending catastrophe” (p. 143). Because of the trend to frame
climate change as a catastrophe and climate engineering as the only way to avert it, they
suggest that the debate about climate engineering might be closing down instead of
opening up (Nerlich and Jaspal 2012). Emphasis on climate change as catastrophe can lead
to demoralization and fatalism among society and policy-makers (Hulme 2009) and limit
social and ethical reflections on the issues by posing boundaries on the “legitimate” debate
(ibid.). They suggest a change in metaphors over time, as dissenting metaphors and
arguments (portraying geoengineering more negatively) were used towards the end of the
sample period (ibid.). Furthermore, they also claim that, as NGOs have started
campaigning against geoengineering, the debate may be shifting. It is precisely these
changes that we aim to capture empirically in a systematic way.
We wish to confront the notion that the debate on geoengineering may be closing down
over time: indeed in scientific literature one can see more publications about the
sociopolitical implications, as well as ethical dimensions, which were lacking before
(Bellamy et al. 2012). These developments suggest that over time the debate may be
opening up to more voices.
The concepts of opening up or closing down have been introduced to explain different
types of technology appraisal processes (Stirling 2008). Appraisals may aim to close down
the formation of technological commitments, in an instrumental way to legitimize specific
decisions. Or appraisals may aim to open up the process of technology choice, by
revealing a wider range of policy discourses. This can be achieved by, for instance,
focusing on neglected issues, posing alternative questions including marginalized voices
and considering ignored uncertainties (ibid.). Thus, the opening up is linked to the
potential of greater diversity of voices.
The notion of opening up or closing down of the debate we are using here refers to the
opening up of the public debate, instead of an appraisal process. Following the previous
definition, we also view the diversity of discourses as enabling the opening up of the public
debate, and especially the diversity of different media frames. Opening up of the societal
debate would be indicated by increasing diversity of media frames. Diversity of frames
can be understood in terms of variety, balance and disparity (Stirling 2007). Variety refers
to the amount of distinct categories of frames. Balance refers to how equal the distribution
of the frames is: if most media items use the “climate as catastrophe frame”, the balance
(and thus the diversity) would be low; if the media items are more or less equally spread
among the different identified frames, then the balance (and thus the diversity) would be
high. Finally, disparity refers to how different the frames are among each other: the frame
“Geoengineering is our last resort” identified by Nerlich and Jaspar, is very similar to
“climate change that will bring about catastrophe” (thus less disparity). In contrast, the last
resort frame is very different to the moral hazard dilemma (thus higher disparity).
3. Methodology
The corpus for this analysis was derived by searching through the newspaper database
LexisNexis1 using “geoengineering”, “geo-engineering” and “climate engineering” as
keywords. A time span of 10 years (2002–2011) was chosen (Nerlich and Jaspal 2012).
We selected the more elite English-speaking newspapers and those with high circulation
rates, as these often tend to influence more regional or local news outlets (Nisbet et al.
Journal of Integrative Environmental Sciences 5
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [1
92
.76
.7.
20
2]
 at
 05
:05
 19
 M
arc
h 2
01
3 
2003). Only articles in which climate engineering was the main theme were selected: this
included both news items and commentaries2. This narrowed down the corpus to 181
articles. All but three of those articles were written between 2006 and 2011.
To code the newspaper articles we combined a deductive, i.e. top-down with an
inductive, i.e. bottom-up approach (de Vreese 2005). We used the framework developed
by Nisbet (2009) as a coding manual, to which we added the themes from the scientific
discussion on climate engineering. As observed before, the coding of smaller frame
elements may be more straightforward than the coding of whole frames (Matthes and
Kohring 2008). We considered these smaller units to be frame elements, which could be
part of a larger pattern, i.e. frame.
Next to this, we added elements, using a bottom-up approach, identifying recurrent
elements not provided by the framework. The coding was not exclusive, as one article
could contain more than one frame elements (and in fact all of them did). Coding was an
iterative process, during which two of the authors coded together some of the articles, and
clarified frame elements, while abandoning other elements not used at all. This process is
similar to other qualitative analyses on media frames (Trumbo 1996; Olausson 2009).
Since our coding approach is primarily interpretative qualitative, the coding should not be
seen as measuring.
Table 1 demonstrates the 21 frame elements that were attained. We have used these
frame elements to code all 181 news items of our data-set. Following this, we performed a
factor analysis [principal component analysis (PCA)] to see which of these frame elements
were part of larger patterns that constitute frames. Factor analysis is a well-established
method for identifying broader frames, using frame elements (Crawley 2007).
4. Results
4.1 Newspaper frames
PCA was conducted (Varimax Rotation) on the 21 elements given in Table 1 (N ¼ 181).
After seven iterations, nine factors were deducted, which explain 62% of the variance (see
Table 2). These factors can be interpreted as frames.
Frame 1: Ambivalence (71% of the articles). This frame is weighing risks and benefits.
Risks were juxtaposed to benefits, much like the devil’s bargain frame (Gamson and
Modigliani 1989). Closer analysis showed that most phrases first referred to a negative
argument and subsequently to a positive argument, e.g. risks were mentioned before
benefits of climate engineering. Seven per cent of the articles labelled climate engineering
as “the lesser of two evils”, referring to the fact that it may be risky, but less risky than
“doing nothing”.
The clustering of the frame elements ambivalence, risk and uncertainty and call for
science suggests the following argument: “climate engineering can be good but can also be
risky; and thus more research is needed”. The call for more research was based on the
seriousness of the climate change problem. Taking this one step further, 6% of the articles
mentioned that ignoring climate engineering is “potentially dangerous” or “irresponsible”.
Frame 2: Avoiding catastrophe (53% of the articles). It tells the story of how the planet
is in trouble and needs to be “saved” from climate change, because it is “catastrophic” or
“disastrous”. In some cases, this was linked to the worry of potential tipping points; 10%
of the articles mentioned the fear of climate going “runaway” or “speeding towards the
point of no return”. Nine per cent of the articles emphasized that we should act now before
it is too late as “we don’t have enough time left available to us” (Canberra Times, 21
November 2009).
6 S. Scholte et al.
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Climate engineering is described as our “only hope” or as something that we may
“need” to do. Often this necessity was linked to the urge to have a “plan B” or an
“insurance policy” in case mitigation does not go quick enough. Nine per cent of the
articles, however, brought some nuance to this notion and described climate engineering
as a “last ditch” or a measure of “last resort”.
Frame 3: Pragmatism (41% of the articles). Even though 5% of the articles referred to
the frame element science fiction, in most cases, it was made clear that climate engineering
Table 1. Frame elements on geoengineering.
Frame elements Sentences or phrases referring to...
Risks and uncertainty Anticipated risks but also to the “unknown unknowns”, doubts about
the effectiveness of the technology
Scientific discoveries Creator of wonderful things, cool ideas, benefits of the technology, it
is cheap and easy
Catastrophe Catastrophe, disaster, we are running out of time, dangerous climate
change, runaway climate, points of no return
Ambivalence A pro and con argument, trying to form a balanced opinion on the
matter, risks versus benefits
Mitigation Relationship between climate engineering and mitigation, moral
hazard dilemma, climate engineering is not an alternative
Call for science The need of sound science, the wish to treat the technology such as any
other science, we need to know more
Current approach is failure How current strategies to tackle global warming are failing, mitigation
will not be sufficient and is going too slow
Benefits for society How the technology will solve the problem and help society, it can buy
us time, offer us an escape route
Necessity The need for the technology to save us, it is our only hope, there may
be no other option
Ethical principles Questions about right or wrong, is it acceptable, relationship between
man and nature, belief in technology, hubris, (un)naturalness climate
No trust in science How science is in over its head, it will never happen, it’s just false
hope, pie in the sky ideas, mad and wacky scientists
Governance/public
accountability
A call for (international) control, who gets to turn the knobs, who
controls, how will the public be involved?
Afraid of science Concerns about science taking a wrong turn, science making things
even worse, opening Pandora’s box, runaway science
Out of proportion “Extreme”, “radical” or “drastic” measures. This is like Dr
Strangelove, or pushing the panic button
Man can change nature Man’s ability to control nature, technological fix, quick-fix, we have
changed nature and we can do it again, we can play god
Conflict Conflict between different interests, groups within society, there is a
debate, it’s a battle, who is going to win?
Economic prospect Economic investments, by both markets and government, competi-
tiveness, funding of climate engineering
Last resort Climate engineering only as a last ditch solution, last resort, if all else
fails
Science fiction Science fiction, fantastical ideas (although often it is said that these
technologies used to be science fiction)
Climate is complex Climate as a complex system, complex machine, we do not understand
it enough
Political risk Political conflict, fears about unilateral action, “rogue states”
It’s serious The fact that climate engineering is gaining attention, it is serious
people who are talking about it seriously
Journal of Integrative Environmental Sciences 7
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [1
92
.76
.7.
20
2]
 at
 05
:05
 19
 M
arc
h 2
01
3 
T
ab
le
2
.
F
ac
to
r
an
al
y
si
s
o
f
fr
am
e
el
em
en
ts
.
F
ra
m
es
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
A
m
b
iv
a
le
n
ce
(n
¼
1
2
8
)
A
m
b
iv
al
en
ce
0
.7
6
8
C
al
l
fo
r
sc
ie
n
ce
0
.6
1
9
R
is
k
an
d
u
n
ce
rt
ai
n
ty
0
.5
2
8
A
v
o
id
in
g
ca
ta
st
ro
p
h
e
(n
¼
9
6
)
N
ec
es
si
ty
0
.6
8
1
L
as
t
re
so
rt
0
.6
5
8
C
at
as
tr
o
p
h
e
0
.6
3
9
P
ra
g
m
a
ti
sm
(n
¼
7
4
)
S
ci
en
ce
fi
ct
io
n
0
.6
8
6
C
u
rr
en
t
ap
p
ro
ac
h
is
fa
il
u
re
0
.5
9
3
It
’s
se
ri
o
u
s
0
.5
2
0
N
o
rm
s
a
n
d
v
a
lu
es
(n
¼
1
0
8
)
A
fr
ai
d
o
f
sc
ie
n
ce
0
.6
9
0
M
it
ig
at
io
n
0
.6
2
1
E
th
ic
al
p
ri
n
ci
p
le
s
0
.5
1
9
B
en
efi
ts
fo
r
so
ci
et
y
(n
¼
7
6
)
E
co
n
o
m
ic
p
ro
sp
ec
t
0
.7
4
4
B
en
efi
ts
fo
r
so
ci
et
y
0
.6
4
3
C
o
n
tr
o
v
er
sy
(n
¼
3
6
)
C
li
m
at
e
is
co
m
p
le
x
0
.8
4
2
C
o
n
fl
ic
t
0
.6
6
7
T
ec
h
n
o
-fi
x
(n
¼
8
2
)
S
ci
en
ti
fi
c
d
is
co
v
er
ie
s
0
.8
3
6
M
an
ca
n
ch
an
g
e
n
at
u
re
0
.5
8
0
G
o
v
er
n
a
n
ce
(n
¼
5
1
)
P
o
li
ti
ca
l
ri
sk
0
.7
5
4
G
o
v
er
n
an
ce
/p
u
b
li
c
ac
co
u
n
ta
b
il
it
y
0
.7
3
1
O
u
t
o
f
p
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
(n
¼
2
7
)
O
u
t
o
f
p
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
0
.8
8
8
N
o
tr
u
st
in
sc
ie
n
ce
0
.4
2
6
E
ig
en
v
a
lu
e
3
.0
0
8
1
.7
2
6
1
.4
9
3
1
.4
2
1
1
.3
2
5
1
.2
6
9
1
.2
0
4
1
.1
1
3
1
.1
0
0
R
2
0
.1
3
7
0
.0
7
8
0
.0
6
8
0
.0
6
5
0
.0
6
0
0
.0
5
8
0
.0
5
5
0
.0
5
1
0
.0
4
6
8 S. Scholte et al.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [1
92
.76
.7.
20
2]
 at
 05
:05
 19
 M
arc
h 2
01
3 
used to belong to the fringes of science, as they are “ideas that were once the realm of
science fiction” (The Australian, 16 March 2009). Such phrases are often followed by the
frame element it’s serious: a statement that climate engineering is now gaining serious
attention since “interest in projects with a twist of science fiction if anything, appear to be
growing” (The International Herald Tribune, 10 May 2007). These statements are not
given any particular value; this growing interest in climate engineering is neither positive
nor negative.
Twenty per cent of the articles refer to the failure of current approaches to tackle
global warming; an assertion that serves to explain why interest in climate engineering is
growing.
Frame 4: Norms and values (60%). The frame element ethical principleswas identified
when reference was made to the “acceptability” of climate engineering or when the
relationship between man and nature was discussed. In 13% of the articles climate was
referred to as something natural, with which humans should not interfere, “tinker” or
“fiddle”. Furthermore, it was often questioned whether humans even have the ability to
control nature. Climate engineering exemplifies “hubris”.
The link with the frame element mitigation means that climate engineering is
compared with climate mitigation, as the SRM type of climate engineering does not
address rising atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations. In addition, 16% of the articles
expressed the fear that climate engineering would even distract from mitigation, i.e. the
moral hazard dilemma.
The afraid of science frame element adds to this frame the fear that science is making
things worse than they already are. Science could open a Pandora’s box or might spin out
of control. Climate engineering is something “scary”, “dreadful” or even “outright
dangerous”.
Frame 5: Benefits for society (42% of the articles). This frame presents how climate
engineering could solve the problem of climate change and thus save the planet and
society, much like is the case for the avoiding catastrophe frame, but without assertions on
whether we need this or not. Several arguments are used to promote the benefits of climate
engineering: it could buy us time to get our emissions back on track3 and in some cases it
might even have additional benefits. Moreover, there is an economic prospect for climate
engineering technologies as companies are starting to “eye up” opportunities. It could
create jobs and make money.
This frame also refers to discussions about the funding of climate engineering. There
are some opportunities for the private sector to invest in climate engineering, but the major
responsibility should be with the government. In some cases, the argument is that we need
to invest in climate engineering, because other countries are starting research as well and
might gain the lead in research and development.
Frame 6: Controversy (20% of the articles). This frame explicitly mentions the
controversy and debate around climate engineering. It refers to parties that make opposite
claims or have competing interests, ranging from conflicts between industries or
organizations to conflicts between countries.
The factor analysis demonstrates that the conflict element is related to the climate is
complex element. The latter refers to climate as a “poorly understood”; a “complex”
system, perhaps too complex for us to “toy with”. The co-occurrence of these two
assertions could mean that complex issues are susceptible to conflict, because they can be
viewed from multiple perspectives. These various meanings with which the topic can be
approached, may lead to potential conflict between proponents and opponents of climate
engineering.
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Frame 7: Techno-fix (46% of the articles). This frame describes climate engineering as
a “techno-fix” or a “quick fix”4 for climate change. The underlying assumption here is that
man can change nature; climate change is a practical problem and we can grab our
“toolkit” to “tweak” the climate. In the techno-fix frame, technology is considered the key
solution to the problem of climate change, because it has helped us several times before.
Emphasis is also put on the ability of humans to control nature: “we are as gods, we
just have to get good at it” (New York Times, 20 April 2010). Scientists are put in the
spotlight as “bright minds” who have created a technology that is “simple”, “cheap” and
“quick”. In fact, if you think about it logically, climate engineering is the most sensible
option: “the only rational scheme” (The Australian, 16 March 2009).
Frame 8: Governance (28% of the articles). Here, the role of governments is the main
issue. If climate engineering is ever to be deployed, the question arises who decides how
and when it will be implemented. In 7% of the articles, a call was made for an international
regime that oversees research and implementation of climate engineering. Related to this
story is the fear of political risk, which refers to the possibility that climate engineering
will lead to political conflict, first, because countries may disagree whether and how
climate engineering should be implemented. Secondly, the fear is mentioned that “rogue
states” might decide to go ahead with climate engineering without the consent of others.
An international framework would be necessary “before some nutcase does it [climate
engineering] prematurely” (The Washington Post, 4 October 2010).
A few stories also address public accountability. An article in the Guardian, 16 June
2011, spoke of climate engineering as a “public good” and therefore “there should be
public participation in schemes”.
Frame 9:Out of proportion (12% of the articles). In this frame climate engineering was
described as “extreme”, “wild”, “drastic” or “radical”. Some articles even referred to Dr
Strangelove or viewed the implementation of climate engineering as pushing “the panic
button”: an exaggerated reaction that may be more extreme than the threat of the situation
itself.
The element no trust in science loads moderately on this frame, and can thus help us
better understand it. Climate engineering is dismissed as an out of proportion reaction,
related to low/no trust in science. Geoengineering is “weird”, “bizarre” and something
cooked up by “mad scientists”.
4.2 Evolution of frames
The distribution of newspaper articles over time is shown in Figure 1. It shows how the
topic peaked in 2009, mainly because of the publication of the Royal Society Report.
The following Figure (Figure 2) shows how the nine frames evolved over time. After
the results of the factor analysis, we recoded all articles for the presence of the nine frames.
Because the articles are not equally spread among the years, we show the percentage of the
articles which used different frames in each year. We have to remind that coding is not
exclusive: one article could contain more than one frames (and most of them did).
Therefore, it is valid to use such percentages to trace the evolution of frames over time.
In 2006, newspaper attention for climate engineering started to emerge, mostly due to
the call of Paul Crutzen, who proposed to use the injection of sulphate aerosols. Indeed,
many articles put Crutzen in the spotlight as the “scientist who worked out the ozone
problem” and a “star of atmospheric science”. Positive aspects of science dominated this
period, which is why benefits for society and techno-fix were two prevalent frames.
No article makes reference to governance issues or political risk.
10 S. Scholte et al.
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Nevertheless, it was already a controversial issue in newspaper coverage, as articles
also referred to the norms and values frame. Some stories wrote about what climate
engineering would mean for the relationship between man and nature, while others
mentioned how climate engineering would distract from current mitigation efforts,
arguments already present in the scientific literature (Kiehl, 2006).
Most emphasis in 2006 was on the frames ambivalence, norms and values, techno-fix,
benefits for society and pragmatism, while other frames, i.e. governance, controversy and
out of proportion, were present far less often. This demonstrates how media coverage was
not yet diverse, mostly focusing on the arguments already been mentioned in the scientific
debate. Especially, the high occurrence of the techno-fix frame highlights the technocratic
attitude with which climate engineering was approached (Bellamy et al. 2012).
In 2007, the governance frame emerged, most likely because climate engineering itself
became a topic of policy-making, as the UNFCCC was going to address it during its
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Figure 1. Amount of leading English-speaking newspaper articles with geoengineering as main
topic, over time.
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
2006 2007
Ambivalence
Conflict Techno-fix Governance Disproportional
Ethics BenefitsSeriousCatastrophe
2008 2009 2010 2011
Figure 2. Percentage of frames over time (2006–2011).
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meeting in Bali. More stories started to include the risks of climate engineering, explaining
the increase of the ambivalence frame. The discussion on climate engineering became
more versatile and diverse; hence the controversy frame became more prevalent, referring
to different voices.
In the run-up to the Royal Society Report in 2009, many scientific articles were
published in 2008 looking into the potential of various climate engineering proposals
(Boyd 2008; Latham et al. 2008). This may explain the increase in the avoiding the
catastrophe and benefits for society frame. The release of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) Fourth Assessment Report in November 2007 may have also be
linked to the increase in the avoiding the catastrophe frame. At the same time, however,
several scholars were publishing about the risks of climate engineering (Robock 2008),
which may be linked to the increase of the out of proportion and norms and values frames.
Moreover governance became a more common frame, as the fear of political risks had also
been expressed (Barrett 2008).
In 2009, the techno-fix frame regained a new boost. This may partially be due to the
publication of SuperFreakonomics, a book in which climate engineering is portrayed as a
simple and cheap solution (Levitt and Dubner 2009). Of all the articles that contained the
techno-fix frame in 2009, 21% refer to the book. In the same year, the Royal Society
Report took a fairly moderate view towards climate engineering, assessing the risks and
benefits of different techniques, probably supporting a continued prevalence of the
ambivalence frame.
The moderate approach taken by The Royal Society may also explain why the division
between the two groups of frames, which was still visible in 2008, disappeared in 2009.
The frames became more equally spread than before. This trend continued in 2010, where
another shift can be signified: a large increase in the governance frame, most likely due
to the Convention on Biological Diversity meeting, held in Nagoya in 2010. At the same
time, the techno-fix frame decreased, which could be linked indirectly to the Climategate
incident in November 2009, which sparked an ethical debate around practices and
usefulness of climate science (Leiserowitz et al. 2010; Vasileiadou et al. 2011). One of the
negative impacts of climategate has been that
a small minority of the American public and a somewhat larger minority of American TV
news professionals—mostly political conservatives—indicated that the controversy made
them more certain that climate change is not happening, and undermined their trust in climate
scientists. (Maibach et al. 2012).
In 2011, the pragmatism frame increased, which may be related to the failures of the
Conference of the Parties (COP) 15 in Copenhagen (December 2009) and the subsequent
COP 16 in Cancun (December 2010), leading to the conclusion that international
mitigation efforts were not making enough progress. The IPCC meeting about climate
engineering in June 2011 sparked the attention of critical NGO’s, partially explaining the
rise of the controversy frame. Another factor that could have led to more stories about
conflict is the SPICE experiment, which also flamed the attention of NGOs. At the same
time, the experiment may explain the increase of the techno-fix frame as some articles
referred to the good of the technology, portraying it as “an important step towards the
ultimate techno-fix for climate change” (Guardian Unlimited, 6 October 2011).
Overall, the ambivalence and norms and values frame have been most prevalent across
the whole period from 2006 to 2011, suggesting that climate engineering has been
controversial since media attention on the topic emerged. Nevertheless, climate
engineering was framed more positively during earlier years as the benefits for society
12 S. Scholte et al.
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frame and techno-fix frame were much more common between 2006 and 2008 than they
were between 2009 and 2011. As the presence of these two frames declined, media
coverage about climate engineering became more diverse by increasingly including social
concerns and by providing a more balanced distribution of the different frames over time.
This is confirmed by the emergence and rise of the governance frame, which was not yet
discussed in 2006 articles but was present in 43% of the 2011 articles.
5. Discussion
Looking at the development of these larger themes between 2006 and 2011, it is clear that
earlier media coverage referred to climate engineering more positively than later media
coverage. Although the frame norms and values were also prevalent from the beginning
on, there was also considerable focus on the benefits for climate engineering between 2006
and 2008. This is in line with previous studies that have demonstrated the salience of
progress as a theme, at the onset of media attention for other emerging technologies.
So is the debate opening up or closing down? Our empirical work shows that:
(1) New frames have emerged over time, increasing thus the variety of available
frames (Stirling 2007).
(2) Overly deterministic frames such as the techno-fix and benefits for society are
decreasing over time; these frames can be seen as legitimizing the use of
technology, and thus their decrease indicates a more nuanced discourse
considering ignored uncertainties (Stirling 2008).
(3) There is more balanced distribution of frames now, than in 2006, increasing thus
balance and diversity of frames (Stirling 2007).
On the basis of this we would say that the debate is now more open than before, as the
diversity of frames is increasing over time.
This opening up could be explained by the suggestion that expanding media attention
can lead to a “war of words” as different interests struggle to get their voices heard
(Scheufele and Lewenstein 2005). The dominance of a particular group of frames may
suggest that earlier media coverage of climate engineering reflected the scientific debate,
which is probably because scientists themselves were a prominent news source, as
confirmed elsewhere (Buck, forthcoming).
The analysis performed in this study has demonstrated how the discussion on climate
engineering is becoming increasingly complex. Climate engineering is an “uncertainty” or
“ambiguity” issue (Bellamy et al. 2012), which would fit into what we have called the
controversy frame, implying that climate engineering is complex and thus has multiple
sides. The emergence of the governance frame and the controversy frame demonstrate
how social aspects and political aspects are gaining momentum in the discussion on
climate engineering. The emergence of these frames, together with the decline of the
technocratic frame can also be understood in the broader context of a changing
relationship between technology and society on controversial technologies, as noted
already in discussions on nuclear waste facilities (Kru¨tli et al. 2010).
As questions about the governance of climate engineering are also gaining momentum,
both policy-makers and the public will have to start actively participating in the discussion.
The time analysis showed how some of the media frames originated from scientists. It also
showed that developments in geoengineering science and technology fuelled media
attention. The time has come, however, for the issue to move out of the scientific arena, so
that the public can be engaged upstream. A transparent and accessible public discussion,
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which does not only take place in the media, is vital, given the divergent frames on the topic
(Corner and Pidgeon 2010). The participatory turn in technology assessment and
governance requires meaningful input from the citizens (Strauss 2010), which can only be
facilitated with reflexivity. The prevalence of the ambivalence frame in the media gives
rise to hope for reflexivity in the debate, as both positive and negative arguments are
presented at the same time. The ambivalence frame emphasizes the importance of
knowledge: too little research has yet been done on the different climate engineering
technologies to be able to properly assess benefits and risks. However, it remains
questionable how the public and policy-makers perceive such a frame. As knowledge has
not been the dominant determinant of public attitude (Scheufele and Lewenstein 2005), the
ambivalence frame may prove to be less powerful than other frames that evoke strong
positive or negative feelings. Nevertheless, understanding the frames used in media
coverage of climate engineering is the first step towards participating in the broader public
debate which is needed.
Notes
1. For the frame analysis, the following search term was used: [(geoengineering or geo-engineering
or climate engineering) and date (geq(1 January 2002) and leq(31 December 2011)) and pub
(The Australian or The Canberra Times or Sunday Telegraph London or The Guardian or The
Herald or The Independent or International Herald Tribune or The Irish Times or Los Angeles
Times or The Mirror or The New York Times or The Observer or Sunday Herald or The Sydney
Morning Herald Abstracts or (Times and London) or The Toronto Star or USA Today or Wall
Street Journal Abstracts or The Washington Post)].
2. This would exclude for instance a news item on the COP in Copenhagen, where geoengineering
is mentioned in three sentences.
3. This argument holds mostly for SRM type of climate engineering.
4. Again this would hold for SRM type of geoengineering.
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